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Abstract

communications designed to prevent users from
hurting themselves or others [4, 5]. Clearly, warning
is not the best option as the decision task is on the
user who has to make a choice. Consequently, users
who are constantly exposed to security warnings [6]
often ignore them due to habituation [3, 7, 8].
Past research has tried to better understand how
users interact with warnings and why users ignore
them [9-13]. Mostly the focus was on examining the
SSL web browser warning messages and their
effectiveness [e.g. 14, 15-17] where participants were
directly recruited. This might present a bias as the
population was not randomly chosen which could
lead to users being more likely to click through
warning dialog messages and less concerned about
their own privacy [14]. Moreover, little research has
examined the effects of warnings on the progression
of the incident event related to the malware use.
Precisely, most of the studies simply examined if
user heeds the warning message by measuring user’s
decision which, mostly, resulted in the binary
outcome: continue or exit. In this context, it is
unclear if the warning message has any effect on
user’s decision.
Interestingly, while number of studies have used
deterrence theory to understand how fear of sanctions
and punishments prevent deviance and crime, only
few studies have studied the effect of punishment
threats in reducing the frequency and severity of
individual offending as suggests restrictive deterrence
theory [18]. Restrictive deterrence suggests that an
individual who commits an act of crime at least once
will be mainly preoccupied with reduction in the
frequency of the illegal act [18]. More precisely, an
offender, knowing that the criminal act is committed,
will seek to decrease the frequency of its offending
hoping to avoid being caught. Restrictive deterrence
concept is particularly useful in our context as it
allows to understand the link between the presence of
sanction
threats
(e.g.
warning
message
communication) and the restriction of the scope of
user’s illegal activities (e.g. reducing the frequency of
the malicious software use). Past studies have failed

Despite the fact that a number of technical
counter-measures do exist to mitigate the risks
related to malicious software, in reality users are the
last line of defense against security incidents. In this
technology-human interaction, warning messages
can represent an important tool to help users when
making a decision. Understanding the effects of
computer warnings on the progression and duration
of the malicious software use would bridge the
existing knowledge gap. Supported by the restrictive
deterrence model and psychological factors, we
conducted a non-controlled field experiment in which
we collected data from no previously recruited
participants. We found that in the presence of the
warning message, the progression of the software use
will be decreased and the duration of both first and
repeated software uses will be reduced. Finally, we
offer important findings for further theorizing and
interesting practitioner insights that could help to
leverage the interaction between the human and the
computer technology with an objective to reduce the
risk.

1. Introduction
The recent security incidents of Target, Home
Depot and Sony Pictures revealed how destructive
malware (malicious software) can be to the
organizational reputation and financial stability. An
organization can receive an average of nearly 17,000
malware alerts in a typical week which represents a
significant amount of time to respond to these alerts
impacting organization’s financial resources and IT
personnel [1]. It is estimated that over 800 million
people suffered from security incidents (e.g. stealing
user’s private information) in 2013 [2]. Although, a
number of technical counter-measures do exist to
mitigate the risks (e.g. personal anti-virus), in reality
users represent the last gate in the decision making
process. In this technology-user interaction, warning
messages can represent an important tool to help
them when taking a decision [3]. Warnings represent
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to clearly establish this link between the warning
message communication and the frequency, duration
and progression of an event [19].
By addressing this challenge, we aim to bridge
this gap by examining how warnings can lead to a
higher effectiveness of sanction threats in presence of
malware when it comes to the progression, reduction
in frequency and decrease in duration of the malware
use.
Supported by the deterrence theory, and in
particular the restrictive deterrence model as
suggested by [18, 20], we aim to investigate three
research questions: 1) is the warning message leading
to an immediate incident termination?; 2) is the
warning message impacting the frequency of
repeated malware use? and 3) does the warning
message affect the duration of the hazard?

2. Theoretical foundation
2.1. Restrictive deterrence
Deterrence theory, a prominent theory from the
Criminology field, suggests that individuals that
intend to commit a crime or antisocial act can be
dissuaded by the implementation of sanctions and
disincentives that are relevant to these acts [21].
Theory posits that there is a high chance of being
caught and punished severely. This general
deterrence theory has been extended, in the last years,
by contemporary theoreticians who proposed the
‘restrictive deterrence’ model which represents the
process whereby offenders limit the frequency and
severity of individual offending [18, 20]. For Gibbs
[18] restrictive deterrence can be defined as “the
curtailment of a certain type of criminal activity by
an individual during some period because in whole or
in part the curtailment is perceived by the individual
as reducing the risk that someone will be punished as
a response to the activity” (1975: 33). Surprisingly,
little research has examined the restrictive deterrence
aspects and its relationship with deterring user from
committing risky or bad actions [22]. Paradoxically,
in the malware context, the offender is the user itself
who is confronted by the deterrent warning message
informing the user about possible sanctions that he or
she may incur if the action is continued. Therefore, it
is expected, according to the restrictive deterrence,
that the user will reduce the frequency of its acts as
user will be sanctioned at some point in time.
Interestingly, most of the past studies that
examined the restrictive deterrent concept were
using the qualitative research method [e.g. 20, 23-25]
investigating a relatively small samples [e.g. 26]. One

important reason for this lack of the quantitative
studies could be the access to data as not only that it
is difficult to build a study that would deal with the
malware context but also, how to avoid bias by not
recruiting participants directly.

2.2. Warnings, human
restrictive deterrence

interaction

and

Restrictive deterrence theory suggests that in the
malware context, users should reduce the frequency
and duration of their acts. In order to communicate
the sanction threat, the warning message is
commonly used as the communication medium
through which, hazard is explained.
However,
relying on the individual, to take the ultimate
decision whether to comply or not, is not the best
option.
Indeed, hazard and control hierarchy model [4]
suggests that warning should only be the third option
presented to the user. The model argues that the first
step is to try to eliminate or remove hazard as much
as possible. The second step should be the avoidance
of the interaction between the user and the hazard and
last option should be to present the warning to the
user who will eventually take the decision.
To better understand this interaction between the
humans and the technology, several models and
framework have been suggested. The human-in-theloop (HITL) framework was proposed as a general
model suggesting a systematic approach to identify
potential causes for human failure [27]. This model
is based on the communication-human information
processing (CHIP) model that describes the
processing steps that are undertaken by the user when
confronted by the warning message [28]. The mental
model distinguished between novice and advanced
users that make sense of warnings in different ways,
coming to different conclusions and consequently,
respond and act differently [29]. Overall, these
models try to explain the interaction between humans
and technology that is sequenced and split in
different stages with the end goal to change the user’s
behavior.
User’s ignorance of warnings is explained by the fact
that users have difficulties distinguishing the real
threats from the false ones [17]. However, the
effectiveness of warnings can be increased by a
warning text that includes a clear and non-technical
description of potential negative outcome [16]. Also,
positioning of the dialog warning message, the
amount of text, the content length, manipulation of
the warning content and the amount of technical
details are some of the cues used to draw the user’s
attention [15, 30, 31]. One issue with these studies is
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that they used a ‘trial and error’ approach in building
the warning content [16] instead of designing the
content based on some theoretical foundations.
When it comes to the restrictive deterrence premises,
where user behavior is expected to be influenced by
the warning message communication, we are still
missing a better understanding of this relationship
and how the interaction between the user and the
warning will influence the decision making process.
Indeed, while majority of past studies focused on
understanding the effectiveness of warnings in
preventing and deterring the occurrence of the hazard
related to the malware propagation and use, little has
been done to investigate the impact of warnings on
the progression and duration of the hazard. In
agreement with [18, 20, 22], we argue that while the
malware hazard may not be fully stopped due to the
warning, understanding the occurrence and
progression of the hazard is of theoretical
importance. Indeed, we expect to see users behaviors
impacted by the warning content built around
psychological cues informing the user about a clear
description of potential negative outcome that the
user will incur in case of the non-compliance.
Hence, based on the restrictive deterrence model and
supported by the psychological factors, we explore
this interaction between the human and the
technology and how the warning message, in relation
to the progression and duration of hazard, influences
the human decision.

3. Research hypothesis
Recent reports on malware progression suggest
that “deceptive downloads” are currently ranked as
major threat as “deceptive downloads pretend to be
installers for legitimate software but actually steal or
destroy the user's sensitive and/or valuable data”
[32]. The recommendation provided to end users is to
immediately stop using the potentially malicious
software and quit it. For example, Apple suggests to
quit Safari web browser or cancel the installation
process if malware has been downloaded [33].
Past studies reported mixed and often
inconclusive results that were dependent on how the
warning message was designed. For instance, it was
found that users react differently when warning is
displayed by Firefox web browser compared to
Chrome [14]. In our study, we are looking to
understand the effectiveness of the displayed warning
message in determining the progression of the
hazard, and thereby to explore if the user’s behavior
will lead to the decreased software use. Precisely, the
impact of the warning message will be of high
importance to user’s decision making process only if

warning message is able to capture users’ attention
and convey information about the possible hazard
[17].
According to Wogalter and Laughery [34], user’s
attention will be driven by (1) spatial and temporal
factors such as novelty, size, illumination, and
contrast, (2) signal words such as “DANGER”, (3)
signal icons such as an exclamation point, (4) color
such as red which signals danger in many cultures,
and (5) pictures such as a pictorial sign displaying
smoking consequences. One study on web browser
warnings, such as those that appear when users visit
suspected phishing websites, showed that altering
text and color led to a significant increase of user’s
attention [31]. Clearly, if user is communicated the
risk that malware will, for instance, destroy its hard
disk, the chances are much higher that user’s
attention and consequently, its decision will be
affected. In this context, we would expect that higher
impact-warning message (i.e. warning message that,
for instance, communicates direct risk for user’s data
will lead to a decreased software use.
Therefore, we hypothesize that the progression of
the software use, in presence of the warning message,
will be positively influenced and decreased by the
higher impact-warning message
In line with the restrictive deterrence model [18],
we argue that during a repeated use of the software,
users will pay more attention to the warning and will
be less inclined to ignore it, which should lead to a
decreased use and consequently, to abandonment.
Specifically, it means that users may feel that at a
certain point in time they will experience negative
consequences from their act. Hence, we can expect
that users will try to decrease or avoid their risky by
reducing their frequency.
Therefore, we hypothesize that the frequency of
repeated software use will be decreased in the
presence of the warning message.
Moreover, according to Jacobs [20] the warning
message threat will lead to the restriction of the scope
of the user’s behavior. This suggests that when user
is presented with a warning message for the first
time, and if the message is displayed during the
repeated software use, duration and progression of
the hazard should be reduced. When hackers try to
access an unauthorized system a repeated warning
may decrease the duration of the security incident
related to their system use, especially if they believe
their actions are monitored [22]. This “limiting
exposure” factor is also highlighted in many countermeasure practitioner suggestions [e.g. 33] and we
argue that in the malware context, users will seek to
limit and shorten the hazard time.
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Therefore, we hypothesize that the warning
message will reduce the duration of both first and
repeated software uses.

4. Research methodology
We designed a non-controlled field experiment
where users can freely download software to
manipulate PDF documents from different open
source web repositories (e.g. sourceforge, github,
etc.). Software was created by one of the authors
using Microsoft Visual Basic programming language.
Software (name PDF Split, Extract and Merge) is a
fully functional application that allows users to
manipulate PDF documents (e.g. split, merge,
extract).
The reason for choosing to build PDF is because
PDF software was found to be one of the most used
rogue IT categories within organizations [35].
On Figure 1 application screenshots are
presented.

a) start up screen

b) main menu

Figure 1. Software used for the field experiment
Once the user downloads the application and runs
it for the first time the startup screen (Figure 1.a) will
appear where user has to click on start button. After
clicking on the button, user has to read, accept EULA
license and provide his or her consent for
participating in the research study. Once user agreed,
one of the four warnings will be displayed to the
user: 1) no-warning message (used as control group);
2) warning type 1 – low impact; 3) warning type 2 –
medium impact and 4) warning type 3 – high impact.
Each of the three warning messages (except the
control message) expresses different consequences
for the user if user continues to use the software that
can be against general security policies , software use
is illegal and monitored, or it is potentially dangerous
and malicious .
We use the “no-warning” message as a control
group to understand the impact of other warnings.
The three warning messages design is based on the
McAfee Security Center layout. McAfee Security
Center is the graphical user interface for other
McAffee products such as McAfee Antivirus. We

kept the original layout but adapted the text for each
of the three warning messages. The low impact
warning message does not have any explicit warning
design elements and is simply advising user not to
continue using the application. The medium warning
contains a more explicit warning message informing
the user about the legal sanctions and the fact that
software use is monitored and tracked. Finally, the
high impact warning message communicates a clear
risk for the user (“This application can be
dantgerous! It can damage your hard disk and erase
all your data!”).
All three textual elements are based on past
studies which used the same or similar textual
content in various contexts [9, 17, 22, 30]. For
instance, Maimon, Alper, Sobesto and Cukier [22]
used similar content to inform hackers about risks
they incur if they penetrate organizational systems.
Display of the warnings is randomized and
controlled by the random function within the
software.
In each of the cases, the user is presented with
two options: exit or continue.
We record four measures:

decision that is recorded as “0” if use clicks
on ‘Exit’ button and “1” if user chooses “Continue”

duration is recorded in milliseconds and
represents the time passed between the click on
‘Start’ (Figure 1a) and the decision (exit or continue)

IP address: user’s internet address (IP
address) is recorded and is used to have more insights
on users’ country origin

MAC address that represents the unique
identifier of each PC, assigned to each network
device (e.g. network card). This measure is used to
understand the frequency and repeated software use
which can reveal repeated user’s behavior
Progression of software use consists of the total
duration (in milliseconds) representing the time user
spent deciding whether to continue or exit.
Progression is operationalized through the duration
measure. Frequency of repeated software use is
defined by the subsequent software uses where
frequency can be 1 if, for example, user used
software only once or it can be more than 1
suggesting that user continued to use software despite
the warning message presence. Frequency is
operationalized through the UserID measure (unique
value assigned to each user and combination of MAC
and IP addresses). Duration of first and repeated
software uses corresponds to the duration (in
milliseconds) where user’s initial software use will be
registered as first (UserID is stored in the database)
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and repeated software use are all subsequent
registered software uses (e.g. second use will have a
certain duration time).

4.1. Participants

4.2. Results
While we did not have any demographics
collected, as we did not actively recruit participants,
the only information that was available is the user’s
country. In total, 790 events were recorded (in 35
cases users chosen not to participate in the study – for
them we did not collect any information but just
counted their refusal to participate). We had users
from 75 different countries that downloaded the
software at least once. In table 1 the breakdown of
the top 20 users’ country downloads is presented.

India
Italy
Spain
France

3%
3%
2%
2%

China
Russia
Australia
Singapore

2%
2%
1%
1%

Table 1. Top 20 users’ country downloads

As the software was placed on the internet, any
user was able to download, install and use the
software freely. This means that we did not recruit
any participants for the study, which increases the
study’s validity. By doing so, we were able to create
and simulate a genuine environment.
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was
given to collect data and human-subject protocols
were followed. In addition, every participant had to
provide his or her consent for being part of a research
study. Once the application was started, a dialog box
was opened informing the user about study’s
objectives (and informing them that no identifiable
information would be collected) and asking them to
confirm their participation. If users’ would chose not
to participate then we would not measure any of their
activities (this was set programmatically). Hence,
users were fully aware of the experiment.
Also, all participants had to accept end user
license agreement (EULA) which, among other
clauses, stipulated that “By downloading this
software, you consent to send usage information to
improve this product and future research”.

Country
United
States
Germany

Netherlands
Turkey
Canada
Romania

% of
downl
oads
29%
13%
13%
7%
4%
3%

Country
Indonesia
Mexico
United
Kingdom
Poland
Sweden
Brazil

%
of
downloa
ds
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%

In Table 2 a detailed overview of warnings
displayed and the corresponding user actions can be
found. Exit action was chosen in 36% of all cases,
while 64% of users decided to continue with the
software use. When it comes to the warning types, as
expected, for the ‘No warning’ message only few
users (10%) stopped using the application while the
large majority (90%) continued. Other warning types
(low and medium impact warning message) had
similar results where majority of users continued
their behavior and were not influenced by the risk
suggested by the warning. However, the ‘high
warning’ message seemed to have a different effect
where 63% of users found the message to be rather
persuasive and thus, decided to exit the software use
compared to the 37% of users who continued.
Overview of all warnings types
Warning Exit action
Continue
(decision=0) action
type
(decision=1)
Low
78 (34%)
151 (66%)
Warning
Medium
95 (44%)
121 (56%)
Warning
High
90 (63%)
53 (37%)
Warning
No
19 (10%)
179 (90%)
Warning
Warning vs Control
Warning
266 (45%)
326 (55%)

Total
229
216
143
198
592

Control

19 (10%)

179 (90%)

198

Grand
Total

284 (36%)

506 (64%)

790

Table 2. Overview of warnings display and users’
actions
We conclude that hypothesis 1 is supported as
progression of the software use, in presence of the
warning message, will be positively influenced and
decreased by the higher impact-warning message.
Next, we wanted to understand if frequency of
repeated software use will be decreased in the
presence of the warning message. We used the
information from the entire set of incidents (N=790)
and estimated whether the mean number of repeated
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incidents is significantly different between the
warning and the control group. Hence, we test for a
significant difference between the proportions of
immediate cessation on warning (when user is
presented with one of the three warnings) event and
no-warning (control group). We performed a t-test to
compare the two proportions using decision as a
dependent variable. The results from this test
revealed an insignificant difference between these
two groups (Z= -6.6; p > .05).
We conclude that hypothesis 2 is not supported as
the frequency of repeated software use is not
decreased in the presence of the warning message.
Further, to understand how warning message
impact the duration and the progression of the hazard,
we analyze the survival time of the software use. As
we cannot simply compare the average hazard
durations, due to the right skewed distribution of the
survival time, we use event history analysis
technique. One such survival technique is the
Kaplan-Meier Survival estimator [36] which enables
dealing with differing survival times (times-to-event),
especially when not all the subjects continue in the
study [37].
The survival rate is expressed as the survivor
function (S): where t is a time period known as the
survival time, time to failure or time to event (e.g.
exit or continue action).
The results of the Kaplan-Meier estimate are
presented on Figure 2. We can see that warning
messages have high effect on the survival times
between the control warning message (no warning
message) and all other warning messages. It means
that the proportion of the software use that survived
is shorter on the treatment (warning) than on the
control (no-warning).
By estimating the Cox proportional-hazard
regression, we tested the significance of the effects of
warning on the hazard duration. The Cox model
allows investigation of the relationship between the
survival of the event and independent measures [38].
The results, calculated using mplus software, are
presented in Table 3.
Results confirm that the warning banner has a
positive association with the hazard of the first
observed event termination.
Hence, the hazard ratio estimate of the warning
measure shows that the warning message is
significantly (more than 1.6 times) increasing the rate
of first observed event leading to much shorter event
duration.
Consequently, hypothesis 3 is supported as hazard
ration increases in presence of the warning message,
indicating that the warning message will reduce the
duration of both first and repeated software uses.

After 3 seconds
control
treatment

Figure 2. Kaplan-Meier function (in milliseconds)

Coefficient
(standard
error)
0.75*

First
observed
events
(N=248)
All
0.181*
observed
events
(N=790)
∗p < .05 (two-tailed);

Hazard
ratio

Log
Likelihood

1.65
-120.23
0.774
-1541.356

Table 3. Cox Proportional hazards survival
regression results

5. Discussion
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we
studied the interaction between the human and the
technology in the context of malware use.
Specifically, how users react in the presence of
sanctions highlighted by the warning message.
Indeed, computer users in their communication and
interaction process with the technology will be more
inclined to follow the procedure if there is a security
concern behind [39], but their decision making
process may be burdened by the overwhelming
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amount of warnings remains [16]. This is very true in
many contexts where users are frequently seeing too
many warnings. For example, users clicked through
Google Chrome’s SSL warning 70.2% of the time but
only 33.0% of Mozilla Firefox’s SSL warnings [14].
Our study examined three hypotheses.
First, we hypothesized that the progression of the
software use, in presence of the warning message,
will be positively influenced and decreased by the
higher impact-warning message. Unlike the past
studies which often had mixed and inconclusive
results, we clearly found support for this hypothesis
where the progression of the software use is impacted
by the warning message. Furthermore, as a higher
degree of impact is communicated to the user, lower
click-through is observed. This finding bridges the
gap of the past studies, which mostly focused on one
single warning type and in a particular environment
(e.g. web browser). Interestingly, during the first
three seconds, the proportion of survival events is
very similar for both warning and no-warning
context. This could be explained by the fact that users
are simply habituated to see warnings and simply
ignore them [3, 8] or it can be that, as suggested by
the mental model approach [40], users can be more
advanced in terms of their technological skills and
thus, can better assess the risks than the novices
users.
Other possible explanations are that users did not
read the computer warning [7], did not understand the
warning [41] or simply do not heed them [42]. In
this content, our finding is in line with these
explanations. However, we clearly show that the
click through (CTR) decreases with the impact level
of the warning message. From the low impact
warning (66% CTR), medium (56% CTR) to high
impact (37% CTR), there is a clear impact on the
progression and duration of the software use. It
would be very interesting to see what would happen
if a
highly effective
(warning
message
communicating high risk) warning message would be
communicated to users. Would the click through
decrease to a very low and acceptable level so we
could confirm that warning message leads to an
immediate cessation of the software use?
Second, we hypothesized that the frequency of
repeated software use will be decreased in the
presence of the warning message. Contrary to the
suggestion of the restrictive deterrence model [18],
we did not find any support that the frequency of
repeated uses is reduced in presence of the warning
message. More precisely, average number of times
user is using software is not different in presence of
the warning or the control message. Hence, the
frequency of repeated uses is not affected and user

decision-making process remains consistent whether
in presence of the warning or non-warning (i.e.
control) message.
We explain this by the fact that if the user is at
first presented with the high impact warning message
and user ignores it, all the successive uses will also
not be deterred as if user was not deterred by the high
impact warning, why would he or she care about the
lower impact warning content? However, if it was the
opposite scenario where user saw the low warning
message that was followed by medium or high
impact warning message, it could be that user’s
frequency of repeated uses would be reduced. This is
something that was found to be effective in the
tobacco industry where users instead of being
presented with the standard packaging message (e.g.
“Smoking can cause a slow and painful death”),
would be presented with a much higher impact
warning message such as pictorial health warnings
that elicits strong emotional reactions which are
significantly more effective [43].
It is evident that the risk communication is a very
important step when designing the warning content.
While in our study the warning message were
randomly displayed to the user, it would be very
interesting to see the impact of the warning message
on the frequency of repeated uses by assigning a
particular impact level warning (e.g. medium) to each
participant, which would then be increased to reach a
high level impact (e.g. the pictorial health-warning
message).
Third, we hypothesized that the warning message
will reduce the duration of both first and repeated
software uses. Our study has an important finding
where the warning message reduces the duration of
both first and repeated software uses. This finding
offers important empirical contribution supporting
the restrictive deterrence model [18, 20]. The
duration reduction can be further explained by the
fact that users want to reduce their exposure for
longer periods as they believe that some malicious
actions could be committed by the software against
them. In that context, users will simply try to avoid
the punishment [44] and react to the sanction threats
originating from the environment [24].
Overall, the results of our study suggest that the
warning message affects the human behavior.
Knowing that the human factor is usually the weakest
link in the security chain [45] and considered to be
the last line of defense against security risks [3], we
argue that the importance of the warning message in
that context becomes even higher.
However, in order to fully understand the warning
message effectiveness other factors need to be taken
into consideration. One of them relates to the fact that
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the language in existing warnings is not as clear as it
could be [16]. This is an interesting insight, as it
could be that the warning communication is simply
not what user expects to read. For example, even a
simple word such as ‘malware’ may not be
understandable by general user population.
Moreover, another aspect that could further
explain our results relates to the organizational trust.
Users will generally have more trust in software that
was issued by organizations that have certain
reputation. Clearly, the level of compliance will
depend on the level of institutional trust [46]. All
these factors, to certain extent, can influence the
effectiveness of the sanction threat communicated by
the warning message.

5.1. Theoretical contribution
Our study attempted to uncover the facets of the
human-computer technology realm, and in particular
the interaction between the human-warning messagecomputer system, which is particularly interesting as
it is not only bringing more clarity to this
relationship, but it also suggests future avenues to
study the antecedents of human behavior. We
empirically investigated the effects of a sanction
threat on the occurrence, progression and duration of
the software use. By doing so, not only did we
support the restrictive deterrence model [18] but also
brought important theoretical insights. Indeed, the
deterrence effect is particularly visible and
pronounced in the time continuum (specifically, after
three seconds) which suggests that a restrictive
deterrence is quite effective but is also reaching its
limits, as it does not explain why the frequency of
repeated uses is not reduced.
In addition, we advanced the fact the interaction
between the human and the computer system, which
is mediated by the computer warning, is a very
complex model that requires further theorizing. Our
study, offers important insights toward this direction.
Thanks to the unique setting we used in this study
and the fact that we did not actively recruit any
participants, enabled us to investigate more accurate
relationships in the human-computer system
interaction.

the warning message was coming from the software
itself or from the operating system.
There are several ways our study could contribute
to the existing challenges related to the information
systems security. When it comes to installing new
software, plugging-in hardware (e.g. external hard
disk, USB key, etc.), or doing any action that can put
in risk user’s data or privacy integrity, we believe
that the operating system (or any other automated
computer technology related mechanism) should
better interact with the user by displaying a more
efficient warning message. And this does not relate
only to the malware context, which we explore in this
study, but it can be applied to all contexts where risks
may be present. For example, we suggest that
computer technology should start the interaction with
the user when USB key is inserted into the computer
and warn the user about the underlying risks.

5.3. Limitations and future research
Our study has several limitations. Due to the
nature of the research design, as we did not recruit
any of the participants, we also could not collect any
demographics from the participants nor to follow up
with additional surveys to better understand who the
users are and get better understanding of their
technical skills, which could have some influence on
the results interpretation. Another limitation is that
among the users that constantly ignored the warnings,
we could not check if they knew that the warning was
coming from the software and not from the operating
system, which was our intention.
For future research, it would be interesting to
extend the participant sample to business users
(organizations) or students as these two populations
could bring interesting new insights about the
deterrent effects of warning messages.
Also, in our study we used a restrictive deterrence
model as the theoretical foundation and built the
warning message content using some of the
psychological cues (e.g. risk consequences), but
future studies could extend on this by using theories
used from other disciplines which could be applied in
the information systems context (e.g. health belief
model or accountability theory).

5.2. Practitioner contribution

6. Conclusion

In this study we used software application which
was displaying computer warnings to users aiming at
understanding their behaviors in the decision making
process. For the end user this ‘displaying’ process
was transparent as it could not be easily identified if

Our study represents one of the first attempts at
addressing an important issue: what are the effects of
warnings on user’s behavior in preventing malware
use? The results suggest that the warning message
affects the human behavior. Supported by the
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restrictive deterrent concept and using psychological
factors to build the warning messages, we found that
in the presence of the warning message, the
progression of the software use will be decreased and
the duration of both first and repeated software uses
will be reduced..

Repeated Low-Trust Software Use", 18th International
Conference on Enterprise Information Systems (ICEIS
2016), 2016, pp. 435-442.
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